14 ideas
| 23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
| 23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
| 23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
| 23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
| 23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
| 23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
| 16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
| 15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
| 15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
| 16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
| 15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
| 23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |