Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ordinatio', 'fragments/reports' and 'Essence and Potentiality'

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43 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]