10 ideas
| 22076 | Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling] |
| 16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
| 22074 | We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling] |
| 22075 | Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling] |
| 3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
| 3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
| 9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
| 3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
| 3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
| 3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |