14 ideas
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |