Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Praed.', 'Essential Attribution' and 'Formal and Material Consequence'

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
14187 If logic is topic-neutral that means it delves into all subjects, rather than having a pure subject matter [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
14188 Not all arguments are valid because of form; validity is just true premises and false conclusion being impossible [Read]
14182 If the logic of 'taller of' rests just on meaning, then logic may be the study of merely formal consequence [Read]
14183 Maybe arguments are only valid when suppressed premises are all stated - but why? [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
14184 In modus ponens the 'if-then' premise contributes nothing if the conclusion follows anyway [Read]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14186 Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16776 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14185 Conditionals are just a shorthand for some proof, leaving out the details [Read]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]