10 ideas
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |