78 ideas
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| 21382 | Things get smaller without end [Anaxagoras] |
| 481 | Nothing is created or destroyed; there is only mixing and separation [Anaxagoras] |
| 21822 | Anaxagoras's concept of supreme Mind has a simple First and a multiple One [Anaxagoras, by Plotinus] |
| 17995 | Basic is the potentially perceptible, then comes the contrary qualities, and finally the 'elements' [Anaxagoras] |
| 18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
| 18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
| 18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
| 18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
| 18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
| 18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 20802 | Snow is not white, and doesn't even appear white, because it is made of black water [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
| 13257 | The senses are too feeble to determine the truth [Anaxagoras] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 22761 | We reveal unreliability in the senses when we cannot discriminate a slow change of colour [Anaxagoras, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| 18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
| 18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
| 18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
| 18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
| 18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
| 13256 | Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras] |
| 13784 | Mind is self-ruling, pure, ordering and ubiquitous [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
| 5118 | Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
| 18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
| 18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
| 18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
| 18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
| 18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
| 18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
| 18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
| 18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
| 18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
| 18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
| 18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
| 18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
| 18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
| 18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
| 18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
| 18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
| 18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
| 18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
| 18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
| 18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
| 18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
| 18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
| 18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
| 18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
| 18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
| 18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
| 18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
| 18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
| 18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
| 18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
| 18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
| 18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
| 18231 | Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras] |
| 631 | For Anaxagoras the Good Mind has no opposite, and causes all movement, for a higher reason [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 22727 | Mind creates the world from a mixture of pure substances [Anaxagoras, by ] |
| 550 | Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 21383 | The ultimate constituents of reality are the homoeomeries [Anaxagoras, by Vlastos] |
| 13208 | Anaxagoreans regard the homoeomeries as elements, which compose earth, air, fire and water [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle] |
| 18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
| 367 | Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything [Anaxagoras, by Plato] |
| 21381 | Germs contain microscopic organs, which become visible as they grow [Anaxagoras] |
| 22726 | When things were unified, Mind set them in order [Anaxagoras] |
| 2629 | Anaxagoras was the first to say that the universe is directed by an intelligence [Anaxagoras, by Cicero] |
| 480 | Past, present and future, and the movements of the heavens, were arranged by Mind [Anaxagoras] |
| 5956 | Anaxagoras was charged with impiety for calling the sun a lump of stone [Anaxagoras, by Plutarch] |
| 7488 | Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist [Anaxagoras, by Watson] |