Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'Philosophy of Arithmetic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

19 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
9837 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
9576 Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17444 Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9575 Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
21214 We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9819 Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
9851 Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]