Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Intro to the Philosophy of Time' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level [Baron/Miller]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original! [Baron/Miller]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things [Baron/Miller]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time? [Baron/Miller]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals [Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge [Baron/Miller]
If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?) [Baron/Miller]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller]
Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real? [Baron/Miller]
If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised' [Baron/Miller]
How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times? [Baron/Miller]
Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist [Baron/Miller]
How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist? [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't [Baron/Miller]
The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic [Baron/Miller]
The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else [Baron/Miller]
The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature [Baron/Miller]
Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy [Baron/Miller]
We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2 [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / j. Time travel
If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist [Baron/Miller]
Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects [Baron/Miller]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future [Baron/Miller]
The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property [Baron/Miller]