10 ideas
23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |