Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'On the Notion of Cause' and 'Tarski's Theory of Truth'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
8378 Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
10825 The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
10820 In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
13499 Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
10818 Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
10817 Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10819 Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10827 Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8375 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
10826 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
7615 Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
4396 The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell]
8376 If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8380 Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
8379 In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
8381 The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell]