11 ideas
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |