Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Critical Common-Sensism' and 'Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence'

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8 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19323 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19137 We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]