Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Critical Common-Sensism' and 'Ontology and Mathematical Truth'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien]
How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien]
Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]