Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Sources of the Self' and 'On Second-Order Logic'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
14249 Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley]
10830 Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
10829 A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
10832 '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10834 Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
13841 Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
10833 Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
4020 The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
4002 My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
4006 I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
4003 Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
4021 Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
4005 To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
4004 Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
4010 In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
4009 Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]