11 ideas
8808 | Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
8807 | Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee] |
8809 | Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee] |
8810 | If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee] |
7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |