14 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |