13 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
| 14597 | Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr] |
| 14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |