13 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 23569 | The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria] |
| 23601 | Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria] |
| 23566 | Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria] |
| 23576 | Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria] |