16 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |