13 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
| 22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |