13 ideas
22642 | Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
22641 | Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
22640 | We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |