Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'A Theory of Universals' and 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]