79 ideas
| 7834 | Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche] |
| 7080 | Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
| 11090 | Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche] |
| 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
| 7079 | Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
| 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
| 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
| 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
| 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
| 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
| 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
| 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
| 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
| 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
| 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
| 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
| 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
| 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
| 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
| 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
| 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 2878 | We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
| 2877 | Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche] |
| 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
| 20355 | The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche] |
| 2291 | A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche] |
| 2871 | Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche] |
| 20381 | It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche] |
| 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 2860 | The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche] |
| 1568 | Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik] |
| 2883 | Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche] |
| 23440 | Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche] |
| 2875 | That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche] |
| 2868 | Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche] |
| 2882 | Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche] |
| 2872 | In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche] |
| 2885 | The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche] |
| 20134 | Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche] |
| 2881 | Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche] |
| 20382 | The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche] |
| 2879 | In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche] |
| 2859 | The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche] |
| 2884 | The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche] |
| 2880 | The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche] |
| 2876 | The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche] |
| 7078 | The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 2874 | Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche] |
| 6869 | Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson] |
| 20137 | The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche] |
| 20139 | Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche] |
| 20373 | A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche] |
| 22394 | Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche] |
| 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
| 2867 | Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche] |