Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Davidson on himself' and 'Euthydemus'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
304 Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
16120 Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
303 Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
302 What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
301 Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
305 Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]