13 ideas
| 6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
| 6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
| 23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
| 23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
| 1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |