Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Mental Files in Flux' and 'Maths as a Science of Patterns'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
6299 Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
22246 A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
6304 Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
6300 Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik]
6303 Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
6302 Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik]
6295 There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik]
6296 Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik]
6301 Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22247 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
22248 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
22242 Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
22243 The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
22245 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
22250 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
22249 The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]