19 ideas
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |