Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'The Varieties of Reference' and 'Spinoza's Ethics'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought

21855

Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord]

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty

19553

Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception

12580

Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]

7643	We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

19551

How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]

19552

We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]

19554

Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving

21866

Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord]

18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

23794

Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

16366

The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities

12575

Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]