15 ideas
14092 | Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen] |
14100 | Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen] |
16519 | No one can conceive of a possible substance, apart from those which God has created [Arnauld] |
14096 | Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen] |
14097 | Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen] |
14095 | Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen] |
14093 | An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen] |
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
14094 | The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
14101 | Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen] |
14099 | 'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |
14098 | An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen] |