Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism', 'Metaphysical Dependence' and 'Can there be Vague Objects?'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Figuring in the definition of a thing doesn't make it a part of that thing [Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Explanations fail to be monotonic [Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Things could be true 'in virtue of' others as relations between truths, or between truths and items [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are structures of worldly items, rather like sentences, individuated by their ingredients [Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
An 'intrinsic' property is one that depends on a thing and its parts, and not on its relations [Rosen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The excellent notion of metaphysical 'necessity' cannot be defined [Rosen]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Are necessary truths rooted in essences, or also in basic grounding laws? [Rosen]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Bachelor' consists in or reduces to 'unmarried' male, but not the other way around [Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
An acid is just a proton donor [Rosen]