Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Meaning' and 'The Approach to Metaphysics'

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science

14799

Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce]

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty

19553

Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

19551

How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]

19552

We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]

19554

Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention

7752	Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]

7751	Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]

7753	We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]