Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Brains and Behaviour' and 'The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18073 Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
19057 Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3460 Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19055 Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
19056 If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
19054 Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett]