Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Essence and Accident' and 'On Interpretation'

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29 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]