Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Deflating Existential Consequence' and 'Morality and Art'

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
12442 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
12439 Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12437 Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
12446 Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12447 That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
12445 If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12449 Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12440 If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
12438 In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
12441 We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
22447 Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
22448 We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
22446 In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
12450 The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]