99 ideas
| 23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
| 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
| 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
| 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
| 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
| 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
| 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
| 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
| 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
| 24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
| 24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
| 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
| 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
| 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
| 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
| 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
| 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
| 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
| 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
| 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
| 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
| 23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
| 23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
| 23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
| 23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
| 23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
| 23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
| 23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
| 23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
| 23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
| 23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
| 23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
| 23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
| 23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
| 24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
| 23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
| 23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
| 23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
| 23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
| 23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
| 23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
| 23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
| 23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
| 23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
| 23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
| 23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
| 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
| 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
| 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
| 23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
| 24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
| 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
| 24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
| 24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
| 24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
| 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
| 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
| 23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |
| 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |