Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
23657 The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
23655 An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23623 Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
23624 The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
23625 Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
23627 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
23626 Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
23621 Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
23622 We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
23659 If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
23662 The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
23661 We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
23654 In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23660 The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
23658 Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
23656 The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
23653 If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
23663 There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]