Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Lectures 1930-32 (student notes)' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy only matters if the subject is a choice between rival theories [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to be rid of certain intellectual puzzles, irrelevant to daily life [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers express puzzlement, but don't clearly state the puzzle [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
We already know what we want to know, and analysis gives us no new facts [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
Words of the same kind can be substituted in a proposition without producing nonsense [Wittgenstein]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Talking nonsense is not following the rules [Wittgenstein]
Grammar says that saying 'sound is red' is not false, but nonsense [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
There is no theory of truth, because it isn't a concept [Wittgenstein]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
All thought has the logical form of reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
In logic nothing is hidden [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Laws of logic are like laws of chess - if you change them, it's just a different game [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is between two rules, not between rule and reality [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
We may correctly use 'not' without making the rule explicit [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Saying 'and' has meaning is just saying it works in a sentence [Wittgenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
We don't get 'nearer' to something by adding decimals to 1.1412... (root-2) [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinity is not a number, so doesn't say how many; it is the property of a law [Wittgenstein]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Using 'green' is a commitment to future usage of 'green' [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is translation, into action or into other symbols [Wittgenstein]
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We live in sense-data, but talk about physical objects [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
Explanation and understanding are the same [Wittgenstein]
Explanation gives understanding by revealing the full multiplicity of the thing [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
If an explanation is good, the symbol is used properly in the future [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought is an activity which we perform by the expression of it [Wittgenstein]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
The meaning of a proposition is the mode of its verification [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are an aspect of the phenomena, and are just our mode of description [Wittgenstein]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]