Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'The Fourth Revolution' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
20100 Classical liberalism seeks freedom of opinion, of private life, of expression, and of property [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
20097 The welfare state aims at freedom from want, and equality of opportunity [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
20099 For communists history is driven by the proletariat [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
20098 Fans of economic freedom claim that capitalism is self-correcting [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
20096 Roman law entrenched property rights [Micklethwait/Wooldridge]