10 ideas
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
17699 | Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |