Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Logological Fragments I' and 'The Causal Theory of Names'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19579 The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
19583 Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
9038 We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
5824 How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
9042 A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
19581 A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
19584 Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
22025 Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22067 Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
5825 Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
5823 The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
9039 If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
19585 Every person has his own language [Novalis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
9043 We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
9040 Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
19582 Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
22027 Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
19580 If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis]