33 ideas
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
20429 | Most of us are too close to our own motives to understand them [Fry] |
20424 | Imaginative life requires no action, so new kinds of perception and values emerge in art [Fry] |
20427 | Everyone reveals an aesthetic attitude, looking at something which only exists to be seen [Fry] |
20433 | 'Beauty' can either mean sensuous charm, or the aesthetic approval of art (which may be ugly) [Fry] |
20430 | In life we neglect 'cosmic emotion', but it matters, and art brings it to the fore [Fry] |
20431 | Art needs a mixture of order and variety in its sensations [Fry] |
20423 | If graphic arts only aim at imitation, their works are only trivial ingenious toys [Fry] |
20428 | Popular opinion favours realism, yet most people never look closely at anything! [Fry] |
20432 | When viewing art, rather than flowers, we are aware of purpose, and sympathy with its creator [Fry] |
20425 | In the cinema the emotions are weaker, but much clearer than in ordinary life [Fry] |
20426 | For pure moralists art must promote right action, and not just be harmless [Fry] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |