12 ideas
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
| 22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
| 22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
| 22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
| 19896 | It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R] |
| 19891 | Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R] |
| 19897 | Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R] |
| 17005 | Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R] |