Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'A Theory of Conditionals' and 'Plural Quantification Exposed'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
10779 A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10781 A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
10783 Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo]
10778 Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
10782 The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]