Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Chemistry' and 'Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism'

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23 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17486 Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 3. Inspiration
14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce]
14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce]
14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
17481 Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
17478 Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
17484 Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
17479 The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
17485 Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
17482 Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
17483 Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17476 Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
17477 Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17480 Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]