69 ideas
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |