16 ideas
| 18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
| 23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
| 23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
| 23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
| 20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
| 6606 | Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein] |
| 8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
| 23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
| 23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
| 23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |