80 ideas
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 16792 | If parts change, the whole changes [William of Ockham] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |
| 6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
| 6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
| 21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
| 21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
| 1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
| 6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
| 6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
| 6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
| 6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
| 21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
| 6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
| 21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
| 21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
| 21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
| 6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
| 21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
| 21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
| 21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
| 21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
| 21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
| 6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |