73 ideas
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |