99 ideas
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |